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In the case of Re ( 'A1( '1, Judge MacCormick made an order that nasogastric 
feeding be administered to a 33 year old anore ·ic patient (CMC) again t her 
wishes. This was the first reportedjudgment in New Zealand on thi ubject. 
The application\ as made by CMC's husband, under section I 0( I )(f) of the 
Protection of Personal and Property Rights et The judgment also mentions 
their h 10 children. aged eleven and e en. It \ ·a an application of last resort, 
since CMC's 20-year illness had become severe and her weight \\as o low that 
her life vas in danger A well a the immediate danger to her life, CMC had 
little chance of survival in the long term unless she gained weight. 
The decision rai es some important issue . CMC had a right to refuse medical 
treatment which had to be overridden by the court. Her doctors had an interest in 
gi ing her treatment to a e her life. Her husband and children had a more 
personal interest in keeping her alive and helping her to recover. The, late also 
had an interest in pre en ing CMC's life_ Re CAI<· illustrate the conflict of these 
rights and interests and one possible resolution of them in the circumstances. 
This paper will begin in Part I by outlining the rea oning of .Judge MacCormick. 
Part II goes on to consider the issue of competence to refuse treatment Part Ill 
begins to explore some of the right and interests mentioned abm e In Part IV the 
writer concludes that the decision was the correct one in the circumstance . 
[1995 J ZFLR 141. 
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I THE DECISION OF JUDGE MACCORMICK 
The judgment begins with the ba ic position on the refusal of medical treatment. 
At common law, no treatment may be administered without the patient's consent2: 
Every human being of adult years and ound mind ha a right to determine what 
shall be done with hi own body, and a surgeon who perfom1s an operation 
without hi patient'. consent commit an a sault, for which he i liable in 
damages 
In addition, s 11 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act tates that "[e]veryone has 
the right to refuse to undergo medical treatment." 
Section 10( I )(f) of the Protection of Per onal and Property Rights Act i a 
statutory exception to the right to refu e medical treatment. Under thi ection, 
the Family Court has jurisdiction to make an order that a person be provided with 
medical treatment of the kind specified in the order. This order override an_ 
refusal of consent on the part of the patient. 
According to the statute, there are two stages to the deci ion to grant an order for 
medical treatment.3 The first stage is to establish 1urisd1ction to make an order. 
The second stage is an exercise of the court's d1scretwn a to whether to make the 
order. 
The court has jurisdiction lo make an order under ection 6 when the per on · 
2 
3 
Schloendor(f" Soc,ety ,?f New York Hovntal 105 E 92 93 ( 1914) 
Protection of Personal and Property Right Act, s 9 
(a) Lacks wholl or partly, the capacit to understand the nature, and to foresee 
the con equence , or deci ion in re pect or matters relating to his or her 
per onal care and welfare, or 
(b) Ha the capacity to understand the nature, and to fore ee the con equences 
or deci ion in re peel of matters relating to hi or her personal care and 
welfare, but wholly lack the capacity to communicate decision in re pect of 
such matter . 
Section 5 states that the person i to be presumed competent until proven 
otherwise. Further, section 6(3) tates that · 
(3) The fact that the person in respect or whom the application is made for the 
exerci e of the Court's jurisdiction has made or i intending to make any 
decision that a per on exercising ordinary prudence would not have made or 
would not make given the ame circumstances is not in itself sufficient 
ground for the exerci e or that jurisdiction b the court. 
These provisions reflect the idea that unles a person i proven to lack capacity, 
that person should be able to make their own treatment decisions, even if those 
decisions seem unrea onable. 
., 
.) 
ln ('MC·, Judge MacCormick found that CMC lacked capacity in three respects· 
her understanding of rele ant information" her appreciation of the situation and its 
consequences and her ability to follow a logical equence of thought in order to 
reach a decision. 4 She did not "understand or appreciate" that her illness was life-
threatening. She "could nol perceive" that nasogastric feeding was virtually 
necessary in order for her to survive. Her thought proces wa not logical in that 
he wanted to survive, but could not see that he would have to gain weight in 
4 Above n I, 344 
order to do so. She tended to blame other for her situation. All this was due to 
her anorexia nervosa5 : 
he was doing it a a feature of her illne s, which i in e sence an illne s of 
mental disorder and lack of rational perception in thi . area It i something which 
I merely note without any connotation of blame If he were in her right mind, 
he would perceive that in fact she has very considerable control over the 
situation and that from a rational per pective she ha been enormou ly 
manipulative But it i not to be looked at as if he were able to perceive the 
ituation rationall - for I am satisfied that he ha not been able to The disorder 
is compul ive for her and in Dr Clark on's [her p chiatri t' l evidence, override 
absolute! everything el e uch a her love for her children, her wi h to be fit and 
well and healthy and independent again, indeed, her expres ed wish to recover 
Once it has been established that the Court has juri diction, there is still a 
discretion as to whether to make the order.6 According to s 6 of the Act, in 
exercising this discretion the primary objecti es of the Court are · 
(a) To make the least restrictive intervention possible in the life of'the per on in 
respect of whom the application is made, having regard to the degree orthat 
per on's incapacity · 
(b) To enable or encourage that person toe erci e and develop such capacity as 
he or he has to the greate t extent po · sible 
The High Court case of Jn the MLJtter <dA 7, decided after Re CA1C, held that the 
patient' "welfare and best intere ts" is another objective which the court has 
regard to in exercising it discretion .. 
5 
6 
7 
Above n 1, 34S 
Protection of Personal and Property Rights Act s 9(2) 
[ 1996] NZFLR 359 
In the context of objecti es, forced nasogastric feeding was not seen as an 
ultimate long term cure for CMC.8 Rather it was a temporary measure to help 
CMC overcome her illness CMC's psychiatrist stated that9 · 
It is my opinion that CMC' fear of weight gain is so overwhelming that de pite 
her best intention he [i ] quite unable to eat enough to gain further weight lt i 
possible that if she can be re-fed to a more health weight by nasogastric feeding 
that she will be able to deal with her fears of weight gain and that her ability to 
think more rationall about her situation will improve with better nutrition It i 
also my opinion that without na oga tric feeding we will make no further 
probrress regarding her weight 
In finally granting the order, Judge MacCormick stated I O : 
8 
9 
10 
Had CMC not expressed a wish to live, to recO\ er fully and to lead a future life 
with her family and in particular her children, then in e ercising the ultimate 
discretion it ma perhaps have been appropriate to decline to make the order 
But having regard to her stated wishes (other than tho e relating to treatment), I 
was sati fled that the propo ed treatment was the least restrictive supplernentarv 
treatment that was available and that it wa a form or treatment which hopefully 
might enable CMC to ultimately exerci e and develop her own capacity to 
overcome her illness In that regard Dr Clark on remained optimistic that he 
still had a good chance or doing o if the initial physical problem could be 
addre sed Lt wa in the e circumstances that the Court accepted re ponsibility 
for making the order sought 
Above n I, 346 
Above n I, 343 
Above n 1, 346 
11 COMPETENCE TO REFUSE MEDICAL TREATMENT 
A Justification for Providing Medical Treatment to lncom1>etent 
Patient 
6 
At common law, the right to refuse medical treatment is based on the inviolability 
of the body. 11 Philosophically, the right is based on the principle of autonomy or 
elf-detennination. The underlying idea i that a decision which is the result of 
an individual' free choice i. a valuable deci ion regardle s of its actual content 
o if an individual freely make a choice which we con. ider to be a bad one, that 
choice should nevertheles be respected. 
As well as the value of personal autonomy, there is the principle of individual 
well-being. In the medical context_ this i the idea that an action we take hould 
promote the patient's phy ical and mental health. The two principles are linked in 
that it will usually promote the patient's well-being to allow her12 to make her 
own decisions with re pect to medical treatment. Thi i for two reasons The 
fir t is that, generall , the patient is the be t judge of what i in her ovm interest 
Her best interests may be per onal to her in that they depend on her own values 
and goals Secondly, it promote the patient's emotional well-being to allow her 
to make her own deci ion about personal matters in her life. 
In some situations, the two values of respect for per onal autonomy and 
promotion of well-being come mto conflict. This happen. when the patient 
makes a choice that we think i not in her best interests, or will not promote her 
II 
l'.2 
In re J. (Afimta/ Pahel1f · <.;1erihm1io11) [198912 WLR 1061 10 2 
"The patient" is referred to in the teminme gender throughout thi paper since 
anorexia patients are predominantly female . 
well-being. The issue then becomes the relative weight to be given to the two 
conflicting principles. 13 
Recent developments in the law tend to give more weight, or a presumptive 
weight. to the patient's autonom . The PPPR Act i an e ample oflegi lation 
which focuses on patient autonomy instead of paternalistic judgments as to what 
is right for the patient. Under the Act, a patient i pre umed competent until 
proven otherwise, and no intervention can be ordered unless there is a finding of 
incompetence. 
7 
So when are we justified in overriding a patient's decision? Following the 
principle of respect for autonom , we may be justified in overriding a patient's 
refusal of treatment if the patient ha not truly made a free choice. Patient who 
lack deci ion-making capacity or competence are not acting with true autonom 
when they make decisions. 14 uch decisions are not inherently valuable. Where 
a patient lacks competence, we are ju tified in giving greater weight to the 
promotion of her well-being than to her personal autonomy. In such situation we 
need to protect the patient from her own harmful decisions. 
Even if intervention is justified, personal autonomy should still be re pected. In 
order to do thi , any intervention hould be the minimum necessary to promote 
the patient's interests.15 Excessive intervention would go beyond the limits of the 
ju tification. Thi idea i reflected in the PPPR Act in 8( a), which state that an 
13 
14 
15 
This analysis of the principle of autonomy and the principle of well-being i taken from 
AE Buchanan and OW Brock /)ec11J111g for Othen - /he J,:tfucs o/Surroxate !Jecrnm, 
Mak111g (Cambridge Univer tv Press. Cambridge, 1989) 29-4 l 
I Kennedy and A Grubb Medu:a/ Law - fexls and Malena/.\ (2 ed, Butterworths, London, 
[989)202 
Above n 14, 293 
8 
intervention should be the least restrictive possible having regard to the degree of 
the patient's incapacity. 
The type of treatment hould also reflect the principle of autonomy For example, 
the treatment given could be one which it is thought the patient would choo e if 
competent. This means that the patient's per onal values and goals, if known, can 
be promoted. With temporarily incompetent patients, the goal of intervention 
could be to promote the patient's autonomy in the long terrn. 16 The medical 
treatment is then justified as a mean of bringing the patient to a state of true 
autonomy. This is reflected in the PPPR Act ins 8(b ), which tate that an 
objective of treatment is to help the patient to develop their future capacity to 
make decisions. 
B Criteria for Competence 
ince the justification for imposing treatment without the patient' con. ent is 
ha ed on incompetence, the determination of competence i a central i ue. One 
writer has stated that the que tion of what the criteria for competence are has 
generally been if:,'110red by lawyers.17 Until recently, no English judgment had 
directly addressed the issue 18 Court have tended to rely on psychiatric 
evidence. This i a mi take ince an as e ment of competence involves ocial 
and legal factors as well as medical ones.19 
16 
17 
18 
19 
bove n 14 204 
M Brazier "Competence, Con. ent and Proxy Con ent " in M Brazier and M Lobjoit (eds) 
Protechng the 1 ·11/nemhle -Autonon~r and Comelll III Health Care (Routledge. London 
199 l) 48 
The recent case of He ( ' (adult : refusal ofmed,ca/ treatment) [ 1994] I AJJ ER 8 l 9 does 
address the issue 
Above n 14, 196 
9 
Under the PPPR Act there i. ,;;ome statutory guidance as to what constitutes 
incompetence The . 6 test is that the patient · "fllacks wholly or partly, the 
capacity to under. tand the nature, and to foresee the consequences, of deci. ions in 
respect of matters relating to his or her personal care and welfare" 
The incapacity i stated to be with respect to decision relating to personal care 
and welfare. In ('Al( , and similar cases, the deci,;;ions concerned are decisions 
with respect to medical treatment o a per on ii;; not found competent or 
incompetent in general, but only incompetent with respect to certain decisions.20 
For example, an intellectuall handicapped person may be perfect!) competent to 
decide what to eat for lunch, and that decision ought to be re peeled. However, 
he may be incompetent to enter into a mortgage tran action because he has no 
understanding of the concept of legal obligation or of the long term futurc .21 
What doe it m<'an to lack the capacity to "under tand the nature and fore ee the 
consequences" of a decision? The statutory words follow the common law test 
used by English courts, that a patient must "understand the nature, purpose and 
effects" of treatment.22 So in interpreting the PPPR Act test, general common 
Ja, criteria for competence are relevant 
Some very basic requirements for competence are an ability to focus attention on 
what is said, an ability to listen and an adequate memory.23 There is no doubt 
that CMC met the every ba ic criteria Another basic criterion is the ability to 
20 
21 
22 
23 
H11ffetworlh\ hmily I.au \'erwce (Buttemort hs Wellinglon I 99- ) 7809-781 0 
J Dawson / he fmpleme11tatum of the Protecl/011 of Peno11al and Propenr R1gl11\ Al'I 
19RR : the Reporl of a J>i/01 Swdv m Uunedm (Otago, l 994) 63 
( 'haller/011 1· Gerson l 1981 J QB 432. Re ( '. above n 18 
B James "The Disabled and the Law" ( l 990) 2 FLB 62 
10 
communicate decision . Under the PPPR Act, if a person wholly lack this 
ability, the patient is deemed incompetent for the purposes of s 6(b). Again, there 
wa no question that CMC lacked any ability to communicate. 
lt is necessary to consider <;ome more ophi ticated criteria for competence [n Ue 
CHC, Judge MacCormick made use of three factors24 which were identified in 
the earlier case of fn the malier of F/25 : 
( l } understanding of relevant information 
(2) appreciation of the ituation and its con equences 
(3) ability to follow a logical sequence of thought in order to reach a decision 
In Re c26 , a decision in the Family Division in England, the following three 
stages to a decision about medical treatment were identified and applied27 · 
( l) to take in and retain treatment infonnation 
(2) to believe it 
(3} to weigh the information, balancing risk and needs 
This three stage test has been accepted as useful by academics28, and is similar to 
the approach recommended b the English Law Comm1ss1on29 The three stages 
correspond roughly to the three factor used in Re ( 'At( · <;tage (I) i a basic te t 
of understanding or cogniti, e skill<; 'tage (2) te. L whether the patient 
appreciates the igniftcance of the information, or its reality tage (3) tests 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
Above n I, 344 
Unreported. 11 January 1995. District Court Auckland, PPPR 68/94 
Above n 18 
Above n 18. 822, 824 
K Stem "Competence to Refuse Life-Sustainmg Medical Treatment " [ 19941 I FLR 3 I . 
The test wa!> approved in Homt' Secretary 1· Rohh [ 1995] l All ER 6 77, 68 l A 
similar three stage test was approved by Kennedy and Grubb, above n J 4, 198, 215 and 
Buchanan and Brock, abo\.e n 13 , 23-25 
Above n 18, 82..i 
1 I 
whether the patient can piece the information together in order to reach a 
decision. Some writers30 include a fourth criterion - a set of values or conception 
of what is good. This can be .ubsumed under (3) The proce of weighing the 
information involves evaluating particular outcomes a good or bad according to 
the patient's value system 
C Reasonableness of the Decision to Refuse Treatment 
It is not part of the criteria that the decision actually reached be reasonable 
There is a temptation, when a patient makes a deci ion that eem unreasonable, 
to think that the patient mu t be incompetent. This temptation should be resisted, 
because it fails to respect the patient's autonomy and impose the judgment of the 
doctor, or society as to what i rea onable. In effect it looks at the outcome of 
the patient's decision making and finds it defective This mean that tho e who 
ha e different or unu ual value tern can be found incompetent. 
The criteria above focus in tead on the pmces,; of decision making. lf the proces 
i defective, then intervention i ju tified The PPPR Act recognises thi problem, 
and s 6(3) states that a patient cannot be declared incompetent merely because the 
deci ion is not one that a per on of "ordinary prudence" would make. 
This right to make unreasonable decisions was affirmed in the English ourt of 
Appeal in the case of Re !11 . In that case, the patient refused consent to a blood 
transfu ion because of her Jehovah's Witne s faith . The Court made it clear that 
"an adult person of . ound mind" ha an absolute nght to refu e medical treatment, 
30 
31 
Buchanan and Brock, above n l 1 23-25 President'<. C'ommi<. ion in Kennedy & Grubb 
above n 14, 198 
[ 1992) 3 WLR 782. 
e en if that refusal i unreasonable in the circumstances, and even if it will 
probably lead to the patient's death. 32 This is an example of the value of 
autonom being placed more highly then the promotion of the patient' phy.rn:af 
well-being. It may be thought that her emotwnu/ or spmtuul well-being would 
uffer more if treatment wa imposed 
It is important to see that a person who refuse medical treatment on religiou 
grounds can be competent, although her deci ion seems unreasonable. 
12 
A Jehovah's Witness patient who refuses a blood transf u, ion typically doe so 
because of the belief that having another's blood in one's body is like taking 
another's soul. The result of a blood transfu ion is that the per on will not 
achieve eternal life. The Jehovah' Witness patient may believe that it 1 better to 
die from refusing a blood transfusion than to accept one and live contrary to the 
faith . Thi seems unrea, onable to man) of u becua e we do not share these 
beliefs, and we feel that they are not worth dying for. 
Con ider thi again t the three criteria for competence listed abo\e The 
Jehovah's Witnes under tands that the blood transfu ion is to replace lost blood, 
and believe that he may die, ithout the transfu ion She weigh, the 
information, and decide that it is better to refuse the tran fu, ion o although the 
criteria require her to balance ri ks and needs, we cannot tell her what weight to 
place on the ariou factor She cannot be held incompetent for failing to place 
the "correct" weight on the risk of d ing. Further, she i following a logical 
equence of thought. lf she accepts the tran, fu ion,_ he will suffer eternal 
32 bove n 3 I 786-787 
damnation. In these circunL tances_ it is logical for her to refuse the transfusion. 
She has freely made the choice to have this value system, and she is now freely 
choosing to follow it. 
13 
Despite this pronouncement of the right to make unreasonable decision , the fact 
remains that in practice, many decision are judged according to whether they are 
reasonable. According to some writers, competence tends to be judged on the 
risk-benefit ratio of the particular treatment.33 o if a particular treatment has 
little or no risk, and would benefit the patient b aving their life, a patient who 
refu e this treatment would tend to be held incompetent. ln effect, this means 
that the more the patient's physical well-being is in danger, the less weight is 
given to personal autonomy. 
This argument is supported by case law. Courts are extremely reluctant to allow 
someone to die, hen a low-risk treatment is availablc.3-1 So in Re 7, although the 
patient was generally competent, the court found that at the time of making the 
decision, she was physically and emotionally weak and so prone to the influence 
of her mother.35 This justified setting aside her decision. 
These factors should be borne in mind when con idering Re ( 'Af( ·. CMC refused 
na ogastric feeding. Although the treatment, a, not guaranteed to save her life, 
medical evidence indicated she would die without it. The treatment itself was not 
ri, k . Mo t people would consider her decision an unreasonable one. The 
33 
34 
35 
Roth Meisel and Lid? in Kennedy & Grubb above n 14, 195 1\-1 icholls "Consent to 
Medical Treatment" [ 19931 Family Law 30 32 
K Stem, above n 28. 5-12 
Above n 3 l , 794-795 
14 
que tion remains whether the case i an example of society impo ing its judgment 
as to what is reasonable and in CMC's best interests. The key to this lies in the 
link between CMC's mental illnes and her refu al of treatment. 
D CMC, Anorexia Nervosa and Com1Jetence 
CMC had suffered from anorexia nervo a for 20 year , and her illness had been 
severe for seven years. Anorexia nervosa is a recognised mental illness. 
Hm, ever. a diagnosis of anore 'ia i not enough to prove that CMC i, incompetent 
for the purposes of the PPPR Act. What must be proven i that CMC lacked 
capacity according to the criteria set out above. It i, therefore nece ary to hov .. 
how CMC's mental illnes affected her capacity. 
The link between a person' mental illne and competence to make deci ion, wa 
considered in Re C. 36 C was a 68 year old patient suffering from paranoid 
chizophrenia. He developed gangrene in hi foot , and his condition worsened to 
the extent that he was likely to die imminently unle s his foot was amputated C 
refused consent to the amputation, although he consented to other medical 
treatment. 
The issue was C' competence to consent. Chad ome trange belief: , including 
the belief that he wa a world famous doctor and the belief that he \\a being 
per ecuted. Thorpe J found that C's refusal of treatment was not a result of his 
mental illness. C' refu al wa, simply a re ult of hi, ordinary value judgrnent that 
it would be better to die with two feet than to live with one. With re pect to the 
decL ion not to amputate, C pa sed all three tages of the competence test 
Above n 18 
15 
So how does anorexia affect a person' competence? Anorexia nervosa i an 
eating disorder, so primarily it affects a person's eating habits.37 Anorexics are 
generally obsessed Wlth food and dieting, and afraid of gaining weight. Their fear 
of weight gain causes them to become manipulative and deceitful in order to 
avoid eating ,vithout arousing the u picion of other . Anorexics behave 
compulsively. Their urge to diet is beyond their control. 
Another feature of anorexia relates to control. Many anorexic ha, e grovm up 
feeling that they were not in control of important aspect of their live The 
development of an anorexic's illne scan often be traced to a subconscious de ire 
to control her environment. The most obvious manife tat ion of this is the 
obse ive need to control her food intake. 
This desire to be in control means that anorexic want to deal with the illness b 
themsel es. They ee medical inter ention a. a threat to their control. Forced 
nasogastric feeding, then, is an extreme form of loss of control for an anorexic 
patient. Further, anorexics' fear of, eight gain mean that they routinel refuse 
artificial feeding. So pecial consideration appl to anorexia when considering 
the issue of competence to refuse treatment. 
37 This summary of anorexia is taken from an interview with Jane Scott, psychologist at the 
Child and Family Clinic. Lower Hutt 
16 
E Anorexia Nervosa and Criteria for Competence 
The three criteria for competence are 
( I ) abilit) to understand infom1ation 
(2) ability to appreciate situation and con equence / believe the infonnation 
(3) ability to follow logical sequence of thought in order to reach a decision 
In this context, the decision is to refuse nasogastric feeding for anorexia, and the 
information is the medical information relating to CMC's prognosis 
In Re CMC, Judge MacCormick found that CMC failed all three stages of the te t, 
due to her anorexia.38 In his words, she did not "understand or appreciate" the 
threat to her life, because she could not "bring herself to under tand it". She also 
did not have the facility to consider the matter logically, since although she 
wanted to live, she "could not ee" , hat wa neces ary in order for thi to be 
achieved. She could not "perceive the situation rationally" . 
It is submitted, with respect, that CMC, and anorexic patient generally, do not 
fail the test at step (I), "understanding", but at step (2) or (3).39 It is possible to 
distinguish two types of defect in a patient's decision making.40 One is 
mi sunder tanding about the nature and likelihood of the outcome of treatment 
This is generally associated with either a lack of information, or a limit in 
cognitive understanding. The other possible defect i where the patient' choice 
fails to reflect her underlying aim and values. 
38 
39 
40 
Above n I, 344-14 'i 
Jane Scott confinned this ee also K tern, above n 28, 544 
Above n 13 , 56 
17 
On this analysis, step (I) is a fairly basic test. 41 It is submitted that CMC passed 
step ( I ) of the test. She understood what nasogastric reeding was, and why it was 
being recommended to her. She under tood that it purpose wa to help her 
increase her weight. She under tood the concept involved. 
At stage (2), it is more difficult to sa I whether CMC "under tood" that her illne 
was Jife-tllreatening. Judge MacConnick found that she did not helteve that she 
wa clo e to death, or that refusing treatment would threaten her life even further 
The issue that arises i whether CMC knew deep dmvn that her life wa in danger, 
and refused treatment anyway because of hero erriding fear of weight gain, or 
whether he genuinely did not believe that he would die becau e her illnes 
caused her to distort the information. The literature on anorexia42 is not decisi\'C 
on this point. It appears to depend on the individual ea e as to whether the 
anore ic patient believe or accept that her illne i , life-threatening Generall , 
he will deny this, at lea t outwardly o CMC probably did fail step (2) of the 
competence test. 
At tage (3 ), CMC was unable to think logical! becau e her illne s was 
compul i e. She anted to live, but compul ivel refu. ed food and treatment. 
This distinguishes her from the Jeho ah's Witne patient who freely choo es to 
value her faith above her life. lt also distinguishe her from C, who would rather 
die than have an amputation. CMC's deci ion to refu. e food was not a free 
decision to value being thin over being alive. Her mental illness meant that she 
41 
42 
1 Brazier, above n 17 36 
AH Crisp Anorexw Nen·ow - I.et me be (Academic Pre . 1980) 149. IL Mintz 
"P~ychoanalytic De cription The Clinical Pictw-e of Anore ia ervo a and Bulimia" in 
CP Wil on, TL Mintz, CC Hogan (ed , ) I-ear of Rei11x I-at (.Ja on Aran on lnc, London 
1987) 85; MS Palazzoli Self Stan ·alwn (Ja on ran on, London, t 986) 82 
had a compulsive fear of gaining weight, and oflosing control , which overrode 
everything else. Her refusal was not the result of her ordinary beliefs, it was the 
re ult of her mental illne s. 
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It is u eful to compare this analysis of anorexia and competence with the 
discussion in two recent English cases. The first is Re W.43 This case, in the 
English Court of Appeal , concerned the right of a 16 year old anorexic patient to 
refuse treatment. The is ue in the case was whether, as a 16 year old minor, W 
had an absolute right to ref use medical treatment. The result was that he did not 
have this right. 1f she refused medical treatment. consent could be obtained from 
a parent or from the court. 
W's actual competence to consent, and how her anorexia affected this, was not an 
i ue on appeal. However, ome of the obiter comment are u eful. At fir. t 
instance, the judge had found that W was competent to make treatment deci ion . 
However, two of the judge on appeal expre sed the vie\ that he was in fact 
incompetent due to her anorexia. Counsel conceded during the case that it is a 
feature of anorexia that it "is capable of destroying the ability to make an 
infonned choice" . Lord Donaldson stated that it creates a compulsion to refu e 
effective treatment, and a firm, i h not to be cured unle and until the sufferer 
wishes to cure herself.44 Balcombe LJ also referred to the effect of anorexia on 
the abilit to make an informed choice.45 The judges' comments indicate that 
they thought W failed stage three of the competence test. They indicate 
43 
4'4 
45 
(1992] 4 All ER 627 
Above n 43 , 630 
Above n 43 , 640 
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clsewhere46 that W is intelligent and quite capable of understundmg the situation. 
Lord Donaldson also noted that it did not eem to have occurred to W that she 
might "leave it too late", ie that she might die if she refused treatment. Thi 
indicates that she may have failed the test at the econd tage also. 
Another recent English case is L 'outh West Her{fimlshire Health Authority v KB.47 
The anorexic patient, KB, did not appreciate the ituation she was in. She saw 
"the prospect of death as a long-tcnn or theoretical prospcct" .48 Ewbank J 
distinguished her itua11on from that of C, the paranoid schizophrenic 49 Unlike 
C, K's refu al was a result o[ her mental illne s. 
F Mental Health (Compul ory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992 
The PPPR Act provides a framework in which to judge a patient' competence to 
consent, and to irnpo e treatment if the patient i found to be incompetent 
Another framework for thi i the Mental Health (Compul ory Asses ment and 
Treatment) Act 1992 (referred to throughout thi, paper a the "MH Act") 
In Re ( 'MC, Judge MacCormick tated that : 
46 
47 
48 
49 
Anorexia nervosa is. of cour e. a di order of the mind and patients with the 
di ease in a sufficient tate or everity have been con idered to be mentally 
disordered in terms or the Mental Health (Compulsory As essment and 
1 reatment) Act 1992 Some have been held to require a compul ory treatment 
order under that Act 
Above n 43, 637 
[1994] 2 FCR 1051 
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The MH Act could have been invoked in Re ('Al(·. The Act has been used, in rare 
cases, to force-feed anorexic patients. Re ( 'M( · appears to be the fir t case where 
the PPPR Act wa used for this purpose. Thi rai e the que tion of why the 
PPPR Act was used in CMC' ea e. 
The key definition in the MH Act is that of "mental disorder"50 : 
"Mental di order", in relation to any person, means an abnormal state of mind 
(whether of a continuous or an intem1iltent nature), characterised by delusions. 
or by di orders of mood or perception or volition or cognition.. of c;uch a degree 
that it -(a) po e a seriou danger to the health or afet of that per on or of 
others; or (b) eriou ly diminishe the capacity of that per on to take care of 
him elf or her elf - and "mental! di ordered". in relation to an) such person, ha 
a corresponding meaning 
The definition has two limb . The fir t limb require an "abnormal tate of 
mind", characterised by certain phenomena. The second limb specifies outcomes 
of that tate of mind. So the abnormal tate of mind it elf i not enough, the 
outcomes must be pre ent before intervention i justified. 
In terms of the first limb, anorexia gives ri e to an abnom1al tate of mind, 
characterised by "di orders of ... volition". A disorder of volition i something 
which affects a person's ch01cc and , or control of their behaviour.51 o anorcxta 
affects a person's ability to choose to eat properly, and her ability to control her 
eating habits. 
50 
51 
Mental Health (C'ompulsory Asse sment and Treatment) et l 992, s 2 
J Anderson "Psychiatric Deci ion-making in the Compulsory A essment Proces " in /he 
Mental Heulth (Compulson A,se\sment and li-eatme11t) Act 1992 ( ZLS, Wellington, 
1992) 56 
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In terms of the second limb, anorexic patients whose illness is sufficiently severe 
pose a serious danger to their own health, and have a seriously diminished 
capacity to take care ofthemselve . Thi explain Judge MacCormick' comment 
that only patients with anorexia "in a sufficient state of severity" are "mentally 
di ordered" within the Act 
Under the MH Act, there are two basic stages to the process of compulsory 
assessment and treatment. The fir t is a period of initial as essment and treatment 
which can last as long as a month. 52 This period begins when a medical 
practitioner, usually a psychiatrist, decide that there are rea onable grounds for 
believing that a person is "mentally disordered". 53 During this period, the patient 
is "required to accept such treatment for mental di order" as the psychiatrist 
directs. 54 
The second stage is reached when a court grants an application for a compulsory 
treatment order (CT0). 55 Before granting the order, the court must be satisfied 
that the person is mentally disordered. During the first month of a CTO, the 
patient i again required to accept the treatment for mental disorder which the 
psychiatrist recommends. 56 
Once one month ha pas ed since the granting of the CTO, treatment cannot be 
administered without the patient's consent, unless a second psychiatrist approve 
the treatment as being in the patient's interests. 57 This requirement of a second 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
Mental Health (Compulsory Asse sment and Treatment) Act 1992, s 10-14 
Mental Health (Compul ory A essment and Treatment) Act 1992, s 10( I )(b) 
Mental Health (Compul ory A sessment and Treatment) Act 1992, s 58 
Mental Health Act (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992, ss 18-27 
Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992, s 59( I) 
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opinion can be overridden if treatment is nece ary to ave the patient's life or to 
prevent serious damage to the health of the paticnt.58 
G The PPPR Act and the Mental Health Legislation 
Given that the Mental Health Act framework is available, why use the PPPR Act 
in this situation? In Re ( 'Af( ·, Judge MacConnick stated that59 : 
Mr C [CMC's hu band] wa advised that an application under the Protection of 
Personal and Property Right Act wa in fact a le intru ive application than one 
under the Mental Health cl 
Although an order under the Protection or Per onal and Property Right Act is 
probably not as far reaching in its elTect a a compul ory treatment order under 
the Mental Health Act it is neverthele , in m , iew, ju ta · difficult to obtain 
There is a stigma associated with becoming a compul ory patient under the 
Mental Health Act CMC wanted to a oid the tigma of "committal proceedings", 
and this appears to be a major reason why the application wa made under the 
PPPR Act.60 This stigma\ 1as also mentioned by Lord Donaldson in Re W, the 
English case of the 16 year old anorexic. He stated that the English Mental 
Health Act probabl) did not apply to W, but that e en if it did, it would be better 
to secure treatment on some other basis61 : 
58 
59 
60 
61 
Although mental illne hould not be regarded a_ an') different from phy ical 
illness, it is not alway o viewed by the uninformed and the fact that in later life 
it might become known that a minor ha been treated under the [Mental Healthl 
Acts might redound to hi or her disadvantage 
1ental Health (Compulsory Asse sment and Treatment) Act 1992, s 62 
Above n I, 343 
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Apart from the general sti!:,>ma of being a mental patient, it is clear that the MH 
Act authorises far more intervention than the PPPR Act. Judge MacCormick's 
observation that a PPPR Act application is less intrusive62 than a MH Act one is 
correct in everal respects 
First, under the MH Act, treatment may be impo ed without the patient's consent 
on the appro al of one psychiatrist. This can continue for a month before an 
application is made to cou11. The approval of a econd psychiatri t i not required 
until after the fir t month of the CTO No econd opmion is required where the 
patient's life is in danger, as it would be where nasoga tric feeding is imposed for 
anorexia . In contra t, under the PPPR Act a court order i required before 
treatment can go ahead. This means that the patient's ea e is ubject to scrutiny 
by an independent body 
There are situations where it i particularly desirable to obtain a court order 
before proceeding with treatment An example i the New Zealand ea e of Re 
W. 63 W was a 74 year old patient who was already subject to a CTO under the 
MH Act, for severe depre sion He wa not eating, and medical evidence 
indicated that ifhe did not receive treatment urgently, he would die within a few 
days. The proposed treatment was electro-convulsive therapy {ECT). Thi was 
accepted to be the onl a ailable option, but it carried sub tantial risk to W W 
was incapable of giving con ent, o the treatment could be given under the MH 
Act onl if a second p ychiatri t recommended it as m W' intere t . Becau e of 
62 
63 
In In the mailer of !Mr [ 1994] ZFLR 6 12, alternative application were made under the 
PPPR Act and The Mental Health Act Judge Green granted the PPPR Act application 
becau e it was "less intru ive" to the patient's rights 
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the high risk involved in treatment. it was not po sible or desirable for a 
psychiatrist to do this. W' own psychiatrist had applied to the court because she 
did not want to be re ponsible if W'. death resulted from treatment This wa a 
case where an order by an independent court was appropriate. In granting the 
order under the PPPR Act. Judge Bo hier stated that it wa a "good illu tration 
[of] the way in which the two Acts are capable of intertwining to provide clear 
guidelines in cases where there is demonstrable risk" _6-I It is submitted with 
respect that the relation between the two Act is far from "clear" . 
There may be situations where a court order i not appropriate The obvious one 
is a case of emergency, where the delay or court proceedings may present a 
problem. However, in emergencJ situation court are \villing to speed up the 
proce s. CMC itself was an urgently cheduled hearing. Another con ideration 
with court proceedings i the stre , hich may be cau ed to the patient b 
litigation.65 
As well as requiring a court order, the PPPR Act i less intru ive in other 
sub tantive re pects. Each order for medical treatment under the PPPR Act 
require a finding that the patient i incompetent to make that particular deci ton 
Only then doe the patient lo e her right to refu e treatment In contra ·t, a patient 
under the MH Act lo es her 1ight to refuse when she is declared to be "mentally 
disordered" by a psychiatrist and later by the cowt There is no asse sment of her 
competence to make individual deci ions. In th, wa , it ma be more difficult to 
64 
65 
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obtain an order under the PPPR Act, not "just as difficult" a Judge MacCormick 
state . 
The PPPR Act is also les inlru ive in the types of treatment which it allows. The 
treatment is that specified in the court order, which must be the lea t restrictive 
possible, and designed to encourage the patient lo develop her future capacity. 
Under the MH Act, a ps chiatrist i authorised to give an medical treatment for 
mental disorder. This is for the di cretion of the p ychiatrist. There are no 
principles in the MH Act to guide the p chiatri t's choice of treatment This is 
whal Judge MacCormick referred to when he said lhat an order under the PPPR 
Act is not a "far reaching" as one under the MH Act 
Allhough the MH Act authorises any treatment for mental di order, it authorises 
only medical treatment.fiw mental di order So when a patient is subject to 
compulsory treatment under the MH Acl, it may still be nece ary lo obtain an 
order under the PPPR Act for medical treatment for a phJ' ·,ea! problem. rhi 
occurred in Re W,66 where an unstable mentally disordered patient was refusing 
the medical treatment nece ary for the afe delivery of her baby 
H Nasogastric Feeding as a Treatment for Anorexia Nervosa 
Since the MH Act ha been used in Ne, Zealand for nasogastnc feeding of 
anorexic patients, il must be assumed that those involved have seen no problem 
with this treatment fitting the de cription of "medical treatment for mental 
disorder" . This may be because the position i now ettled in England 
66 (1991 ) 11 FRNZ 108 
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There wa initially doubt in England as to whether thi treatment was medical 
treatment for mental disorder within the English Mental Health Act.67 The first 
difficulty wa in regarding na ogastric feeding a "medical treatment" at all, since 
all it does is provide the patient with artificial nutrition. This was etlled in l 993 
when the House of Lords held that nasogastnc feeding 1s medical treatment. 68 
The more difficult issue i whether nasogastric feeding can be described as 
treatment for a mental di order. If a mental disorder cau es someone to refuse 
food, then nasogastric feeding treats the physical symptoms, but does not directly 
treat the underJ_,ing mental disorder.69 Directly treating the mental disorder 
generally involves psychotherapy. 
This i sue , a addre ed in England in the Famil Divi ion in ,C....'outh West 
Her{fbrdsh,re Health Authority v KB. 70 ln that case, Ewbank J accepted counsel's 
argument that 7 t : 
anorexia nervosa i an eating di order and relieving the symptom i ju t a 
much a part of treatment a, relieving the underlying cau e The ymptoms are 
exacerbated by the patient's refu al to eat and drink, the mental di order become 
progressive] more and more difficult to treat and o the treatment b naso-
gastric tube i an integral part of the treatment of the mental disorder it elf the 
treatment is nece ary in order to make p vchiatril- treatment of the under! in, 
cau e possible at all 
This reasoning wa endor ed by Hoffmann LJ in the Engli h Court of Appeal in R 
i· ( 'roydon Health Authonty. 72 In the Croydon case, nasogastric feeding was 
67 
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endor ed as treatment for a p ychopathic disorder. This shows that the reasoning 
extends beyond eating disorders. 
So whether nasoga tnc feeding of an anorexic i medical treatment for mental 
di order depends on the purpo e of na ogastric feeding. If there wa no propo ed 
treatment for the anorexia. and the feeding '"a simply to keep the patient alive, 
then strictly it would not be authorised by the UK Mental Health Act. 73 There are 
no relevant difference, in the New Zealand MH Act which indicate that a 
different approach hould be taken in thi count1y. The feeding must be part oC 
or a prerequi ite to. treatment for anorexia. 
Nasogastric feeding is imposed only where the patient's life i in danger. A 
psychologist74 I spoke to characterised the treatment as one designed pnmarily to 
save the patient's life. Thi i a prerequisite for treatment for anorexia in the 
loose ense that treatment i not po ible if the patient I dead 
In Re CMC, Judge MacConnick said that the purpose of treatment was to get 
CMC to a phy ical condition where he could thin"- rationally about her situation 
and "address issues necessary for her to recover". 75 Under the PPPR Act, the 
court can order any medical treatment, not just treatment "for mental disorder" 
However, the Judge's tatemenl hows that he characterised the feeding as a 
prerequisite to psychiatric treatment for anorexia. 
72 
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It is submitted, with respect, that the basi on which the English decisions 
declared nasogastric feeding for anorexia to be "medical treatment for mental 
disorder" i questionable. The i ue did not ari e in Re C '}./(·, but it i likely that a 
New Zealand court would follow the rea oning of the English cases. It is 
intere ting to note that in ngland, there i no alternat1 e statutory procedure such 
as the PPPR Act in New Zealand. 
There are some remainmg is ue relating to na oga tric feeding a a treatment for 
anorexia. W1iters on anorexia are agreed that na oga tric feeding hould be 
imposed only in cases where the patient's ltfe 1s at risk. 76 The problem \vith 
imposed feeding is that it tends to "reconfirm anorexics' earlier expe1iences of 
hfe"77in that it deprives them of any control over their situation. This can result 
in the patient becoming even more uncooperative. The psychological damage 
cau ed by imposed feeding can create further deterioration in the patient's mental 
condition. The weight gain cau ed by impo ed feeding may cause her to panic 
and attempt to lose even more weight once the feeding is over Forced 
nasogastric feeding, then, i an absolute last resort. There is little doubt that thi 
wa the ea e in Re ('A1C 
We can now return to the que tion of whether the MH Act i a more appropriate 
framework for the impo ition ofna oga tric feeding for anorexia than the PPPR 
Act. The main argument in favour of the MH Act is that it allows psychiatrists to 
get on with their job without having to re ort to the court, e pecially where 
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treatment is administered over an extended period One wnter argue that this i 
important because lawyers and judges do nol under land what really happen with 
psychiatnc patients, and attempt · to promote their right to refuse treatment are 
"damaging to patients and destructive of treatment planning" 78 
If this i simply an argument that psychiatrist know what is best for patients, the 
answer is that p ychiatric patients have rights and they are enlilled to have those 
rights upheld by a court 
If it is an argument about the inconvenience of obtaining a court order, this 
argument is not convincing in the ea e of na oga tric feedmg for anorexia. The 
order in CMC was for feeding to be administered if nece ary, over the period of 
a year. Since the treatment i an emergency one only, it 1 unlikely that a further 
order would be required an.er lh1s period expired. CL due lo the chronic nature of 
CMC's condition. a further order wa required. it 1s submitted that it 1s not undul) 
onerous to require an application after a year. P ychiatrists are till re ponsible 
for deciding whether to make an application, and once the application is granted. 
whether and how often to impo e feeding. 
Given that avoidance of court proceeding 1 the on!) reason for using the MH 
Act, it is submitted that il is desirable to use the PPPR Acl o that the patient has 
the protection of a court order The impo it ion of medical treatment without 
consent is a seriou undermining of the patient's personal right . Mentally ill 
patient are inherently more ulnerable than others and perhap. more in need of 
78 L McGarry and P Chodoff "The Ethics of Involuntary Ho pitali ation" in P,yc/uatrn. 
1~·,h[(:.\ (Oxford Univen,itv Press, Oxford 1981) 217 
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the court's protection. lt i desirable for a court to balance the various interests 
and considerations involved. The issue is not just a medical one, it is social and 
legal a welL \ hich make. a court order appropriate 
Despite this, it is not clear from the judgment in /?e ( 'Af( · why CMC's case was 
dealt with in thi wa when other application had been brought under the MH 
Act. lt remains to be seen whether the PPPR Act will be used for these situation 
in future. 
Ill THE DISCRETION 
According to 9 oft he PPPR AcL a finding of incompetence give the court 
1unsdict wn to make an order under that Act. The next step is for the court to 
exercise its di ·crehon in deciding\ hether to grant the order. The objective of 
the court in the exerci e of its di cretion are contained in 8 : to make the least 
restrictive intervention pos ible and to encourage the patient to develop her future 
capacity. 
In Re "Tony", 79 the judge expressed the opinion that the s 8 objectives are 
relevant to the finding of juri diction as well a discretion. This was becau e·80 
79 
80 
the issue of an hortfall in capacity or competence i not ea ily eparated from 
consideration or the degree or intervention (ii' any) that ma be required to make 
up for that horllall the applicant may need to how not only an impairment in 
competence. but that the effect or that impaim1ent i uch that intervention i. 
necessary 
(1990) 5 ZFLR 609 
Above n 79. 615 
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The later case of R ,. ( '81 rejected this approach, stating that the legislation clearly 
contemplated a two stage proces , the first stage being a pure competence lest. 
Perhap the difference between the two approache would not amount to very 
much in practice. The approach in Re "Tony" would involve consideration of 
social factors in determining the i sue of competence. The writer ha already 
slated that these other factors usually come in lo a decision about competence, 
whether this i expres 1 admitted or not Further, with order for medical 
treatment, jurisdiction is al ways detem1ined with reference to a particular 
treatment or cour e of action Jn thi way, it i difficult lo eparate the 
intervention issue from the competence issue. 
In Re CMC, Judge MacCormick treated the i ue ofjun diction and di cretion 
separately. In exercising his discretion, the Judge stated that82 : 
Had CMC not e pres ed a wi h to live. to recover full and to lead a future life 
with her family and in particular her children. then in exerci ing the ultimate 
discretion it ma perhap have been appropriate to decline to make the order 
But having regard to her tated wishes (other than those relating to treatment). l 
was atisfied that the proposed treatment wa the least restrictive supplementary 
treatment that wa a ailable and that it wa a form or treatment which hopefully 
might enable CMC to ultimately exercise and develop her own capacit to 
overcome her illne , 
The Judge is obviously making reference here to the s 8 objectives. However, his 
comments go beyond these o~jectives in ome respect . This i justified since the 
objectives are not strict rules, they are the pmnury oh1ect1ves only. There still 
remains a discretion to take other factor into account The following i an 
81 
82 
(1992] ZFLR 162, l6S-l66 
Above n l . 346. 
analy i of some of the other factor which Judge MacCormick appeared to 
consider in CMC' ea e. 
A The Sanctity of Life, CMC's Wish to Live and CMC's Best Interests 
32 
The Judge comment that if CMC had not expres ed a wi h to live, he ma have 
declined to make the order for her medical treatment. lt is necessary to consider 
the possible basis for such a decision. 
It is recognised that the state has an interest in pre erving life. Thi take the 
form of an interest in preserving the life of the part1cular patient, and an interest 
in preserving the sanctity of all life. This ab tract interest does not general! 
ju tify overriding an individual's right to refuse medical treatment. The patient 
has a much stronger personal interest in directing the course of her own lifc. 83 
Despite this re pect for autonom , court are very reluctant to allow a patient to 
die and will go to great lengths to prevent thi . When the result of a patient's 
refusal is likely to be death, the court can use the tool of competence to achieve 
the desired result. It was tated earlier that where a decision to refuse treatment 
will result in death, and treatment carries little ri k, there i u uall a finding that 
the patient is incompetent in some way. 
In Re ( 'Jv!C, there wa no need to distort the concept of competence. CMC wa. 
clearly incompetent to make decisions regarding her medical treatment. This 
appears to ju tif the court's intervention to take measures to keep her alive. Doe 
the court's intervention really depend on CMC's "wi h to live"? 
83 Re Conroy 486 A 2d 1209 ( 1985) 
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The emphasis on CMC' wi hes can perhaps be attributed to a respect for 
autonomy. However, it could hardly be suppo ed that she was competent to make 
a deci ion as 10 whether or not she wanted to live. If she had expressed a wi h to 
die, this decision would not have been respected because CMC was not 
competent to make it 
Perhaps the Judge is referring to the principles in 8 He states that, given her 
wish to live, the treatment i the least restrictive po. sible and one de igned to 
encourage her to develop her future capacity. With respect to the principle of 
encouragement, perhap if the treatment i 10 achieve thi , CMC must have a 
de ire to live. If CMC is not interested in recovery, na ogastric feeding can only 
be a measure to keep her alive. She can onl develop her future capacity b 
overcoming her anorexia, and the initiative for thi must come from her. 
ls forced na ogastric feeding the "least re trictive interven110n"1 Thi i uppo ed 
to be judged according to "the degree of the subject person's incapacity". Judge 
MacCormick consider "least re trictive" with reference to CMC' wi he~ and her 
physical condition, not the degree of her incapacil Na ogastric feeding appears 
to be the least restricti e alternative consistent with her living, because of her 
physical state. She wants to live, therefore nasoga tric feeding is the lea t 
restrictive altemati e consistent with her wi he .. It i significant that Judge 
MacCom1ick does not mention the least restrictive mterventwn, but the lea. t 
restrictive supplementary treatment. The point i imply that the lea t restrictJVe 
alternative must be judged again t ome goal or other, not just the de!::,rree of the 
person's incapacity Here the goal wa CMC' urvival and recovery 
34 
A similar approach was taken m the PPPR case of Re W. 84 In that case the 
patient was 74 years old and was refusing food due to , evere depression . Without 
the recommended 1rea1menL he would die w11hm a re~ da Like CMC, he wa 
incompetent to give consent but expres ed a wi h to live. Unlike CMC, he wa 
not refusing treatment The judge accepted coun el' argument that one of W' 
personal rights protected by the PPPR Act, was hi "personal right to live" . mce 
W had expressed a wish to live but wa unable to change the course of events 
himself, there was a dut on the part of the court to promote his per onal right to 
live. The recommended treatment wa extremely ri kv, bu1 was held to be the 
least restrictive alternative since it was the only treatment that had a chance or 
keeping W ali e. 
This analysis is confinned by the jud!:,>ment in In the Maller ofA,85 a recent High 
Court decision under the PPPR Act Coun el in 1hat ea e argued tha1 "lea 1 
re trictive intervention" mu t be read a the lea t re trictive intervention po sible 
to ensure that the person's welfare and be 1 mtere t are cared for Thi argument 
was effectively accepted by the court. This shows that the least restrictive 
intervention should be judged, according to the High Court, again t 1he welfare 
and best intere ts or the patient. 
In the Al/a/fer of A hold that "welfare and be t intere t "1- a hidden objective or 
the PPPR Act, in addition to those tated ins 8. According to the High Court, the 
purpo e of the Act i clearly concerned with welfare and bes1 intere L , and to 
deny this is to pla with word . lt 1s likely that part of the real motivation for the 
84 
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decis10n in Ne CA!C wa the Judge's feeling that nasogastric feeding wa m 
CMC's best interests. 
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The danger with a be t intere l approach is that society will impose its judgment 
as to what i. in the patient's best intere t . at the expense of the patient' 
individual rights and autonom . This is exactly what the PPPR Act aimed to 
avoid. 
B The Right to Die 
Consideration of the right or wi h to live natural! leads to the que tion of the 
right to die. Judge MacCormick tated that he may not ha e granted the order 
had CMC not expressed a wi h to live. What is the position if she had actually 
expressed a wish to die? 
lt is recognised that the state has an interest in the prevention of suicide. 86 This is 
related to its interest in preserving life It follows from this that the impos111on of 
medical treatment without the patient's consent ma be justified if the patient has 
done omething in an apparent attempt to kill herself, and the treatment i to avert 
the consequences of that action. 87 This is clearly the case if the suicide attempt is 
the result of mental illne s or other temporary incapacil . In CMC's ea e, if he 
had expressed a wish to die, this would probably have been overridden because or 
her mental illness. 
86 
87 
Above n 83 
POG Skegg l,aw, !•,'thin and Medic111e (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988) l I 0 
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The difficulty in ea e where the patient is competent is to distinguish a uicide 
atlempl from an exercise of the right lo refuse life- aving medical lreatmenl. ll 
may be that refu ing treatment is simply a deci 10n to let the illnes run it natural 
course. The House of Lord has held thal a decision to refuse lreatment, even 
treatment prolonging life, 1s not suicide. 88 
In many cases of refusal oClife-saving lreatment, there i no issue or suicide 
because the patient has no specific intent to d1c.89 For example, a Jehovah's 
Witness who refuse a tile- aving blood transru ion does so oul of faith . Her 
attitude is that whether she dies i God's decision o in Re l. Lord Donald on 
described the case as not about lhe righl lo die , but lhe righl to choose how lo 
hvc.90 In Home Secretary v Rohh,91 Thorpe J held that a hunger stnkmg prisoner 
was not committing suicide. He was imply rerusing lo be {ed. 
With anorexia, there i imilarly no que tion of uicide becau e anorexic patient 
generally do not want to die.92 Indeed, Judge MacCormick held that CMC did 
not even believe or accept that she might die The typ1cal anore ic pallent refuse. 
to eat from fear or gaining weight, not in a deliberate atlempt to kill herself So 
the forced feeding of an anorexic patient cannot be ju tified on the ground of 
preventing uicide. 
88 
89 
90 
9 1 
92 
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bove n 83 
Above n 3 1, 786 
Above n 28, 682 
Jane con confirmed this 
37 
C CMC's Family 
As well as CMC's wish to live, Judge MacCormick noted her wi h to live with her 
family and in particular her children . .He tated that it ma have been appropriate 
to decline to make the order had she not expressed this wish. Il is obvious that 
the decision would alTect her hu band and children Her husband was the 
applicant, who had brought the application as a last resort, wanting lo respect 
CMC's wishes but also wanting her to recover. It wa al o in the children' 
interests that their mother should recover and be able to care for them. 
The difficulty is to find a legal basis on which the Judge can con ider CMC's 
family situation when deciding whether to give her medical treatment without her 
consent. The PPPR Act doe not expressly provide for the family' interest to be 
taken into account. However, orders under the PPPR Act u ually do involve the 
patient's family in some way It ha been aid that the main purpose of 
proceedings under the Act is otlen lo permit familie to act in ways that would 
otherwise be prevented by the incapacity of the patient.93 
Judgments under the Act usually mention the family in some aspect. In Re W,94 
the judge mentioned W' famil _, tated that the had been consulted a much a 
possible, and that they supported the proposed treatment. The order for W's 
treatment was granted. Jn In the matter of!A17 .95 the judge mentioned that the 
family were familiar with the proposed treatment and were keen for it to 
93 
9-1 
95 
Above n 21 , 5 1 
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Above n 62, 613 
38 
continue. The order for 1MT's treatment was granted. 1n Re S,96 the order for 
treatment was not granted ince although S wa incompetent, the proposed 
treatment was not the lea t restnctive po ib1e. The judge stated that S's mother 
did not consent to the proposed treatment, and that she had taken him to a Maori 
herbalist 
The foregoing cases involved patients who were incompetent to consent, but in 
none of them was the patient actuall~ refu ing con cnt It i a different matter to 
invoke the interests of a patient' family member to ju tif imposing medical 
treatment in the face of the patient's refusal. 
Another possible basis for consideting CMC's family is the state interest in 
protecting innocent third partie . In the United State , thi interest has been 
recognised as one that can outweigh a competent individual's right to refo e 
treatment.97 On this view, CMC's children can be seen as innocent third part1e 
who will be harmed by her decision to refu e treatment 
In the United States, mo tor the cases on this subject involve the protection or 
unborn children , hen their mother refuse to undergo Cae arean birth. for 
religious reasons. In one case,98 the competent mother was ordered to undergo 
the Caesarean where the chance of survival through natural b1rth were ery 
small, and the chances through Cae arean birth were good. The ba i of these 
decisions is the entitlement of the unborn child to the law' protection Thi was 
found to outweigh the mother's right to refu e treatment 
96 
97 
98 
[ I 992] ZFLR 208 
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The only English case ts !?e S,99 a recent case in the Famil_ Division. ln !?e S, the 
competent mother refu ed a Caesarean for religious rea ons and the operation 
wa ordered becau e of the danger to mother and child from natural birth The 
judgment was very short due to the urgency of the case. The reasons for the 
decision were not given in any detail , although the judge purported to rel on the 
American cases.100 
The decision in l~e S i highly controversial and ha been criticised b 
commentators. IOl One problem with the decision is that English courts have 
never recognised that any late interest can outweigh a competent person's right to 
refu e medical treatment. Another problem i that Engh h law does not recognise 
an unborn child as having any legal existence. 102 
Despite criticism of Re S, it may be that the idea of protection of innocent third 
parties is applied, but more conservatively than in the United States. In the 1995 
case of Home ,\'ecretary v Robb, I03 Thorpe J of the Family Division stated that10'"' 
99 
100 
10 1 
102 
103 
104 
The consideration of protecting innocent third partie is one that is undouhtedlJ, 
rei:og.msed in thi juri diction, as is evidenced b_ the decision of tephen Brown 
P in Re S It eems to me that within thi juri diction there i perhap a stronger 
emphasis on the right of the indi idual' elf-determination v.hen balance comes 
to be truck between that right and any countervailing late intere t 
[ 1992] 3 WLR 806 
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Even if this interest i to be recogni ed, it would probabl be limited to situation 
where the life or the innocent third party i in danger. CMC's children were not in 
an physical danger, they simply stood to lose someone who pla ed a large part in 
their lives emotionally and financially . There i some American case law which 
sugge ts that a parent's respon ibility to her child ma justify overriding her 
refusal of medical treatment. 105 lt is a huge step however. from the protection of 
the child's life to the protection of his or her general welfare. 
lt seems that the only legitimate basis for considering CMC' family is a part or 
CMC's wishes for her future life. In this wa . the Judge i impl giving effect to 
her expressed wish to have a life with her children. This hows a re peel {or 
autonomy which i in line \.vith the philosophy of the PPPR Act. 
IV CONCLUSION 
On the facts of Re CMC, Judge MacCormick's decision is clearly the correct one. 
CMC would die without treatment, and she wa clearl not competent to refu e 
that treatment. However, some or the base for the deci ion are que tionable. ll 
ma be that in these kind of case , the court is in the end, forced to folio\ its 
consctence. 
10 The Appftcatum qf Pre\1de11t and D1rec1on <?/ Ueorgetou n College, Inc ( 1964) 331 F2d 
I OOO Kennedy and Grubb, above n 14, 3 58, sugge t that this case wa really a situation 
of lack of competence. 
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